ABSTRACT Using a smart grid, which increases efficiency and makes it easier to monitor critical equipment in a power grid. Online real-time applications equipped with a wireless sensor network (WSN) sense and collect data in order to provide information on power generation, transmission, distribution, and customer. Applications, the administrator, and (mobile) consumers can access the WSN directly. The communications between them must be protected from adversaries to avoid false data injection, which could cause damage either to the applications, the equipment, or the sensor nodes. Another threat comes from the characteristics of the sensor nodes, which makes them vulnerable to denial of services (DoS) attacks, i.e., flooding with false messages. In this paper, a multiuser dynamic cipher puzzle (M-DCP) equipped with TinySet is proposed. This new method provides guaranteed confidentiality in the multiuser WSN authentication and lightweight DoS resistance. The M-DCP using RC5 encryption combined with the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) and partial recovery can increase brute force complexity to about 1.861 × 10 137 iterations. Furthermore, the regularization of TinySet is done to simplify the administrator's task in defining the initialization parameters. The experiment showed that the regularized TinySet required less storage space with a 64-bit index than with a 32-bit index or with Counting Bloom Filter. In addition, the average query and verification time of the proposed scheme increased only by under a second or 36% compared to Counting Bloom Filter-based authentication. This is still appropriate for implementation in the WSNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, smart grid (SG) technology has emerged as a potential solution for improving the efficiency of traditional power grids. Typically, a wireless sensor network (WSN) is utilized for real-time sensing and data collection of various parameters in the SG system. WSNs are seen as suitable technology for SGs due to their flexibility and because it is possible to deploy them in complex geographical environments. Multi-functional sensor nodes are deployed in several important SG components, such as the power plant, power transmission lines, circuit breakers, transformers, etc., to collect information related to the condition of these components [1] . Real-time monitoring of various SG components is needed to ensure robust and efficient operation. Moreover,
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to fulfill user requirements efficiently and increase satisfaction, user interaction is included [2] . To achieve this, full duplex communication is required between the end user and the provider.
Common applications of WSNs in SGs include power quality monitoring and distributed generation on the power generation side; equipment fault detection, outage detection on the power transmission and the distribution side; wireless automatic meter reading (WAMR), power grid equipment monitoring and control on the consumer side [3] . These are only some of the possible applications (see Fig. 1 ). The data in the sensor nodes can be accessed directly from other systems and personal user devices [4] , [5] to get real-time values sensed by the sensor nodes to gather critical information. Therefore, the communication between multiple users (persons as well as applications) and the WSN needs to be organized, which is challenging in SG environments. Due to the massive amount of communications between the SG components, security in the WSN is an important topic for discussion between researchers and practitioners. The system has to be protected against adversaries to avoid the misuse of user data, such as the users' identities and their power consumption. In addition, the control signals from the system provider must be protected against infiltration by adversaries [1] to avoid false alarms in the monitoring system, which could lead to wrong corrective actions [6] , [7] . Other potential threats are denial of service (DoS) attacks, intrusion attacks [8] and false data injection [9] .
A scheme is required that ensures authenticity and confidentiality in WSN communication to protect the information transmitted between the administrator, end users, the SG system, and the WSN. The heterogeneousness of the architecture and the network of stakeholders who have access to the WSN increases the security complexity. Moreover, WSNs have limited available energy and are often located in places that are hard to reach so maintaining and monitoring the sensor nodes has to be done remotely. Currently, the implementation of security in WSNs still has weaknesses, especially when large verification computations are involved. The deployed scheme must have low complexity, especially on the receiver side (WSN).
The main contributions of this study are:
• The development of a TinySet membership scheme that is appropriate for WSN environments and has low storage overhead as well as acceptable verification time. This scheme organizes the communications between different applications, the administrator and even mobile users.
• The application of regularization to optimize the number of buckets utilized in the TinySet. This simplifies the task of the administrator to define the parameters in the initialization phase: the administrator only needs information about the maximum number of authenticated users and the false positive probability, which acts as the membership security level.
• The development of a lightweight communication scheme for code and data dissemination in WSN-based SG environments. The proposed scheme uses M-DCP to guarantee message authenticity and confidentiality, ensuring that the transmitted packets are valid and free from tampering. Furthermore, the use of a dynamic puzzle is aimed at protecting against DoS attacks with low sender-side delay. A summary of the notation used in this paper is given in Table 1 . The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews previous works and state-of-the-art deployed systems; Section III explains the proposed scheme; Section IV presents the result and discussion based on an implementation of the proposed methods. The last section provides a summary and possible topics for future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
The security of WSNs has been approached in various different ways. This study focused on the authentication of multiuser communication in WSNs as protection against DoS attacks. This type of attack either takes over the user's computation resources or network connectivity. There are various techniques to prevent DoS attacks, such as the Cooperative Fuzzy Artificial Immune System (Co-Fais) [10] , random drop [11] , intrusion detection frameworks [12] , [13] , and Selective Authentication based Geographic Opportunistic Routing (SelGOR) [14] . Co-Fais was improved by using throughput and sleep interval as learning parameters in the fuzzy system [10] in order to increase its detection accuracy and learning capability. It is claimed to be the first real-time intrusion detection method for WSNs, but it is not mature enough to be implemented because of application target limitations [15] . Random drop filters received packets in an efficient way by dropping received packets randomly when a sensor node exceeds its energy limitation [11] . Random drop can only be implemented if the number of received signatures is half of the capacity for accepting valid signatures. The intrusion detection method proposed in [12] was developed to protect communication in key establishment against two specific types of DoS attacks, i.e. selective forwarding and Hello Flood attacks. It improves the performance of the throughput and packet delivery ratio in the packet transmission procedure. Meanwhile, the intrusion detection method proposed in [13] was developed to detect and prevent false data injection in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) for WSNs. This framework integrates security into CoAP communication with acceptable overhead. Both intrusion detection techniques mitigate DoS attacks in the low OSI-layer whereas the present paper focuses on the application layer. SelGOR is claimed to be the first reliable and efficient method for authentic data delivery for WSNs [14] . It is equipped with entropy-based selective authentication and distributed cooperative verification mechanisms to avoid DoS attacks. However, there still exists a delay in the verification process, which can be a problem in resource-constrained devices.
Another approach is multiuser authentication for WSNs. Based on the identification protocol, entity authentication can be grouped according to three mechanisms, i.e. weak authentication, zero-knowledge authentication, and strong (challenge-response) authentication [16] . Weak authentication, for example using a password, is not appropriate for multiuser communication in WSNs because of its high storage overhead at high numbers of senders. A classification of the other identification protocols for multiuser communication in WSNs is shown in Fig 2. Symmetric key-based multiuser authentication for WSNs is provided by the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) family, i.e. [17] (µTESLA), [18] (multilevel µTESLA), [19] (L-TESLA), and [20] (multi-sender µTESLA). µTESLA is an efficient and fast authentication scheme for WSNs and other resource-constrained devices. Furthermore, RC5 encryption is integrated in µTESLA to guarantee data confidentiality. This scheme is efficient in energy, communication and storage overhead. A drawback of µTESLA is the requirement of sending the initial parameters individually to each sensor node, which leads to low scalability. To overcome this problem, multilevel µTESLA has been developed [18] . This method broadcasts the required parameters in the initialization phase so that the flexibility of µTESLA is increased and its communication overhead is decreased. Both these µTESLA variants focus on TESLA implementation in applications, whereas L-TESLA was developed to reduce verification delay on the receiver side [19] . However, this advantage is offset by an increase in broadcast overhead, which is overcome in another variant of TESLA, namely LD-TESLA. As the number of sensor node implementations increases, the number of stakeholders who want to access the sensor nodes also increases. Multisender µTESLA supports broadcast authentication and user addition, which increases the scalability [20] . However, it requires time synchronization because of the delayed authentication. The received messages cannot be verified directly so the receiver has to wait for the key, which is distributed after a message has been sent. In addition, the sender needs to define and schedule an interval to communicate with the receiver.
Another multiuser authentication mechanism for WSNs is zero-knowledge authentication, for example the Identitybased Multiuser Broadcast Authentication Scheme (IMBAS), which utilizes a variant of BNN Identity-Based Signature (vBNN-IBS), as proposed in [21] . The authors claim that their method has high security and is scalable, but implementation requires expensive computation for the bilinear pairing operation. In the Efficient Identity-based Broadcast Authentication Scheme (EIBAS) this drawback is addressed by minimizing computation and reducing the signature size and thus the communication overhead [22] ; however, the bilinear pairing still exists. Later, this was improved in [23] by accelerating the authentication (Accelerated vBNN-IBS). This method uses sensor node participation to reduce the complexity of signature verification. The sensor lifetime is extended because of efficient resource usage and faster verification than in traditional IBS. However, the implementation of Accelerated vBNN-IBS must be complemented by a digital signature that requires high computation in the sensor nodes. The practical identity-based multiuser broadcast authentication scheme, BASIS, is the first identity-based scheme with free pairing equipped with message recovery [24] . All the aforementioned ID-based cryptography methods support multiuser authentication. Using zero-knowledge verification provides high security but requires high computation at the sensor nodes, which limits its usage.
The third approach of multiuser authentication for WSNs is challenge-response authentication, which uses an asymmetric key. This was developed using ECDSA [4] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [25] . ECDSA has been combined with the Certificate-Based Authentication Scheme (CAS), the Direct-Storage-Based Authentication Scheme (DAS), the Bloom-Filter-Based Authentication Scheme (BAS), and the Hybrid Authentication Scheme (HAS) [4] . CAS has high security but also high computation cost and thus high energy consumption. DAS overcomes this limitation by storing all of the public and secret key pairs, which decreases the computation cost but leads to high storage overhead. HAS is equipped with Merkle Hash Tree to support a large number of registered senders. However, this scheme is not scalable and has high per-message overhead. BAS utilizes a Bloom filter vector for membership queries, which decreases the storage overhead but leads to false positives. A counting Bloom filter has been proposed to support user addition and revocation, which increases scalability and facilitates hardware implementation. However, it does not reduce the number of false positives compared with the original Bloom filter and even increases the memory overhead as a result of realizing dynamic user modification [26] . A variable-increment Bloom filter can reduce the number of false positives with efficient memory usage, but it adds hardware complexity and requires more storage space than using the original Bloom filter [27] . Multiuser authentication using ECC was improved by accelerating the verification process in [25] , which focused on designing a new protocol that supports addition, removal and anonymity of users. Unfortunately, the main verification process is signature-based. This method has high complexity and adversaries can use this opportunity to send false signatures (signature-based DoS attacks) [28] .
In the present study, Dynamic Cipher Puzzle (DCP) for multiuser authentication was chosen for heterogeneous WSNs. DCP uses a puzzle scheme that accompanies the main signature to prevent signature-based DoS attacks and has a procedure to guarantee confidentiality. Moreover, the Algorithm 1 Bloom Filter Based Authentication Scheme
sender-side delay is reduced using a threshold function. However, DCP implementation lacks user management in the case of multiuser WSNs. Therefore, M-DCP equipped with TinySet is proposed here. M-DCP accommodates public key transmission in a secure way. TinySet was chosen because it uses a space-efficient pointer-less chain based hash table [29] , [30] .
The next section discusses existing techniques that are related to M-DCP equipped with TinySet. The first is Bloom filter-based authentication, which uses a Counting Bloom Filter for the membership scheme, and the second is Dynamic Cipher Puzzle, which is utilized as protection against DoS attacks. These two methods are described in Subsections II-A and II-B, respectively.
A. BLOOM FILTER BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME (BAS)
Bloom Filter Vector (BFV) is a membership scheme that has low complexity and is appropriate for devices with resource constraints [4] . This scheme always accepts validated users but there is also a possibility that adversaries are accepted. This possibility is called the false positive probability and is the determining parameter to measure the security level. The false positive probability of a BFV is formulated by [4] 
The size of BFV (m) is commonly defined in the initialization phase to accommodate the number of validated users stated in [31] 
Furthermore, this equation can also be used to measure the minimum size of the BFV required to store the defined number of valid users and the false positive probability. Counting Bloom Filter (CBF) is a variant of BFV that supports member removal. This scheme has the same mechanism as BFV with increased storage. It requires an additional space that acts as a counter. This counter increases by one if a valid user is added and removes by one if a valid user is removed. CBF contains 4 bits counter for each membership vector [4] . Thus, the total size of the CBF is four times larger than the BFV.
BFV and CBF membership schemes can be used in the authentication of resource-constrained devices complemented by ECDSA with partial recovery as the main signature algorithm. The details of this signature generation are shown in Algorithm 1. The domain parameters are defined as D = (p, A, B, G, n, h), where p is a prime number to specify the base field, A and B are the first and second coefficient for the equation defined in the elliptic curve y 2 ≡ x 3 + Ax + B (mod p), G is the base point, n is the prime order of the group generated by G, and h is the cofactor of G. Let PubK = s.G where s is the private key and G = (G x , G y ). The resulted formatting of the user's transmitted message is shown in
which consists of message M 2 , the signature Sig and the user's public key PubK .
B. DYNAMIC CIPHER PUZZLE
DCP is a weak authenticator with low complexity. DCP is used to accompany a signature or another high-complexity process to filter out incoming messages from DoS attacks. Encryption is another advantage of this scheme and the sender side delay for each puzzle strength can be controlled by using the quadratic threshold function described in [28] .
This limits the number of hash iterations based on a predetermined security level that is reflected by the maximum value of the puzzle-strength (l max ). Thus, the maximum number of hash iterations for each puzzle generation in the quadratic threshold function is as shown in
The steps of DCP using a quadratic threshold function are shown in Algorithm 2. First, the signature is generated using ECDSA. The next step is puzzle creation satisfying Algorithm 2, line 2. The initial value of puzzle strength (l) is l max . The value of l will be decreased by 1 if the number of hash iterations exceeds the threshold value that is shown in Algorithm 2, line 4. The puzzle solution is found if the result of puzzle strength (l) is higher than zero. The last step is tag generation. The tag aims to obscure the index and puzzle strength values. The length of the tag is l bits.
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Cipher Puzzle
1 Sig ← ECDSA_sign(M ) 2 while H(Sig).substr(l) = ETM .substr(l) and l > 0 do 3 if iteration >Threshold_Func(l) then 4 l ← l − 1 5 Reset(iteration) 6 end 7 EncM ← Enc_RC5(M rand K idx ) 8 ETM ← MAC (EncM ) 9 iteration ← iteration + 1 10 end 11 if l = 0 then 12 Zero_Solution 13 else 14 tag ← H(idx l prev l) 15 Send(Sig tag ETM .substr(l,len(ETM ) − l) EncM ) 16 end
III. M-DCP WITH TINYSET
As mentioned above, multiuser authentication methods for WSNs are vulnerable to signature-based DoS attacks. They focus on a main signature algorithm without using any filtering method. This paper proposes M-DCP equipped with an optimized fixed size of the TinySet. M-DCP uses an optimized puzzle scheme that controls the sender-side delay and guarantees the confidentiality of the transmitted message using RC5 encryption. Moreover, using a predetermined size for the TinySet ensures the storage required by the WSN at a specific security level and has lower complexity than using a variable size, especially in membership verification.
The memberships of registered users are differentiated by their public key and user ID. These are both inserted by the administrator into the fixed-size TinySet. An illustration of the communication occurring in the membership addition protocol is given in Fig. 3 .
Users or applications who want to access the WSN register their public key and user ID with the administrator. The administrator verifies their identities by using user authentication. Other low-cost and secure mechanisms can also be adopted [5] , [32] . After the identity has been verified, the sender information will be inserted into the TinySet and forwarded to the WSN.
An illustration of user membership in TinySet can be seen in Fig. 4 . First, the user information consisting of the public key and the user ID is concatenated. This value is compressed by using an irreversible hash function, for which the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 was selected. The hash result is unique and represents the position of the user in the TinySet, consisting of the bucket number (B), the chain index (L), and the fingerprint (R), as described in
where X is an input parameter that represents a unique value of user. In WSN, X is the concatenation of user identification and his public key. The administrator has to determine the initial value of the number of buckets, the acceptable false positive probability, and the fingerprint size. The bucket capacity must be initialized according to the number of predicted authenticated users. This prevents high storage overhead, especially in the sensor nodes. Regularization of the number of buckets is proposed to optimize the use of buckets and to simplify the initialization task. The number of buckets is calculated based on the maximum number of registered users. The higher the value of the fingerprint size, the lower the value of the false positive probability, but it also increases the storage overhead; the maximum fingerprint size is 31 bits [27] . The chain index value is either 32 or 64 [27] . The TinySet only requires two initial parameters: the maximum number of users and the security level respectively. Both values are determined based on the requirements of each study case. The false positive possibility for TinySet membership can be deduced from (7) [27] . In addition, if the average number of items in each chain is approximately 1 item long (λ ≈ 1) it means that the number of items in each chain is not more than one. The average number of items in each chain is shown by
Based on these two equations, the length of the fingerprint (cell) and the approximate number of buckets (B) can be deduced. The approximate number of buckets must be rounded either up or down, for which regularization is proposed. This method differentiates the number of buckets based on bucket capacity. The number of buckets will be rounded down if it complies with the expected number of valid users in each bucket, whereas the number of buckets will be rounded up if the first statement is not fulfilled. This method is shown in
The result is the actual number of buckets (B actual ), which can be used to measure the actual average number of items in each chain (λ actual ) by using (8) . Then, these two parameters can be used to measure the capacity of each bucket (B cap ) by using
This overall initialization process is illustrated in Fig. 5 . The bucket capacity, fingerprint size, number of chain indexes and the number of buckets determine the total storage required to develop the TinySet. This storage overhead is shown in
Communication between users or applications and the WSN can start once the sensor nodes have received the TinySet. The steps for real-time communication are shown in Fig. 6 . This explains the process on the sender side and the receiver side. The registered user starts to communicate with the sensor nodes by constructing a signature from the message. ECDSA with partial recovery is used as the main signature algorithm [4] . This can be classified as ECC-based cryptography, which is appropriate for resource-constrained devices. This method was chosen because its key length is shorter than that of RSA for the same security level [33] . The process is continued with session key generation for the puzzle construction. The session key is generated using a one-way key chain that utilizes a hash function as the main algorithm. The set of key chains is stated in [28] 
where N key is the number of expected keys and H i (x) means repeating the hash function i times the value of x. The value from the last iteration of key chain generation, H N key−1 (x), is called the commitment key. This parameter is sent to the receiver and used to verify the next transmitted session key.
The third process on the sender side is encryption of three secret parameters, i.e. the message, the session key, and a random value that acts as candidate for the puzzle solution. RC5 [34] was selected as the block cipher encryption algorithm for the proposed scheme. Previous works have successfully developed RC5 and ECDSA for WSN environments [1] , [28] , [35] . The next process is puzzle construction. The idea is finding a random value (P idx ) as a candidate puzzle solution that matches the defined pattern. The number of matching bits is called the puzzle strength (l), which represents the security level of the puzzle. A higher value of l means higher security of the puzzle. DCP was selected to avoid sender side delay [28] . This technique was developed for singlesender environments and needed to be adjusted for multiuser environments (M-DCP). The following changes were made:
• Message authentication code (MAC) elimination. This is because the public key needs to be sent together with the message in M-DCP and the payload of the WSN is limited.
• Fixing the tag size. The original DCP concatenates the tag with the MAC. MAC is dismissed so that the length of the tag must be fixed and redefined. These two changes affect the pattern used for puzzle generation. The pattern of the proposed M-DCP is described in
and
H 1 and H 2 denote two type of cryptographic hash function. The additional hash function aims to replace the task of MAC. The puzzle solution is found if the first l bits of encrypted messages' hash result satisfies (13) and l is higher than zero. The maximum puzzle strength determines the length of the tag. This paper defines 24 bits as the maximum puzzle strength (l max ) and the length of the tag. Based on (5), the maximum number of hash iterations is 357795 using a quadratic threshold function and has security level 2 l = 2 24 . Instead of MAC, the proposed scheme is equipped with two variants of the hash function. SHA-1 and MD5 were selected to represent the first and second cryptographic hash function respectively. The last step on the sender side is tag generation. The tag is the hash result from concatenation of the index, the current and the previous puzzle strength. This aims to obscure the index value. The sender transmits the message, which contains several parameters, as shown in
U id is not part of message M 2 because M 2 must be encrypted and must be part of EncM . The length of each parameter is described in Table 2 . Therefore, the total length of the transmitted packet ranges between 78 and 102 bytes. The first step on the receiver side is tag verification. This process is inspired by previous work [28] . The difference is in the static size of the tag. A tag size of 24 bits and VOLUME 7, 2019 the maximum puzzle strength are selected. The second step checks whether the hash result of concatenation of the public key and the user ID already exists in the TinySet. Three values are used to authenticate the user: the number of buckets (B), the chain index (L) and the fingerprint (R). If the fingerprint is found in the specific bucket and chain index, then the user is authenticated and the process is continued with puzzle verification. The receiver or sensor nodes need only two variants of the hash function to make sure the puzzle is valid, as stated in (13) . Adversaries can create a copied valid puzzle based on a fake message, so a session key is used to verify the puzzle. As stated in (14) and (15), the key is sent in encrypted form so it must be decrypted using the stored previous session key. The last step is signature verification. This process has the highest complexity on the receiver side. It aims to make sure that the transmitted message is valid. Furthermore, this mechanism can retrieve part of the message with a maximum size of 10 bytes.
IV. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
This section describes the design of the experiment, the result of the experiment and a security analysis of the proposed method in Subsections IV-A, IV-B and IV-C, respectively.
A. MATERIAL
This section explains the requirements for implementing the proposed scheme. It is divided into two subsections: the assumptions are stated in Subsection IV-A.1 and the experimental scenario is described in Subsection IV-A.2.
1) ASSUMPTION
In the simulation it is assumed that: a. The base station, the administrator and the sender have unlimited resources. Moreover, they cannot be compromised. b. This paper does not focus on flooding protocols. Simple flooding without complicated routing was used. c. This paper focuses on static sensor nodes. d. The sensor nodes have enough resources to perform digital signature verification and decryption. For reference, the implementation of the digital signature and the encryption-decryption mechanism in a real WSN environment is shown in Table 3 . This is a small example of cryptographic operation implementation in WSNs. 
2) EXPERIMENTAL SCENARIO
The system was implemented in Network Simulator-3, version 3.2. The details of the network topology are shown in Fig. 7 . There are several senders, namely stakeholder STA, the administrator and a number of node sensors (SN). They are connected by 3 routers, R1, R2 and R3, and the gateway of the sensor nodes is managed by a base station. The details of the utilization of the OSI layer are shown in Fig. 8 . The initiator is STA, who acts as the sender. The number of senders is expressed in 32.n e < N < 32.(n e + 1), n e = 2, 4, 6, . . . ,
where n e denotes even number higher than zero. The specific number of senders aims to show the effects of using different numbers of buckets with either chain index value 32 or 64.
If the average number of items in each chain for one bucket is close to 1 (λ ≈ 1), then the items in index 64 (L = 64) are only multiplications of index 32 (L = 32). This is different if the number of items or authenticated users complies with (16) . Then, the buckets will contain empty space and the value of λ will be more dynamic. The administrator is a stakeholder who has enough resources for high computation. His main task is managing sender addition and removal and after that forwarding the TinySet to the sensor nodes as receivers. Furthermore, the administrator can also control other networking activities, especially at sensor nodes that act as receivers and have limited resources. The experiment utilized up to 200 sensor nodes with 250 kbps of bandwidth as receivers.
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
In our simulation, two types of membership schemes were analyzed, i.e. CBF and TinySet. Based on the size of the chain index, the TinySet was divided in two types: the one with 32-bit indexes (TS32) and the one with 64-bit indexes (TS64). Thus, there were three membership schemes, i.e. CBF, TS32 and TS64.
1) THE IMPACT OF REGULARIZED TINYSET
There are two important parameters in each membership scheme, i.e. storage overhead and execution time. The execution time for user addition will be low if TinySet adds more buckets than items to each bucket by increasing the bucket capacity. However, this increases storage overhead. The number of buckets must be arranged by controlling the value of λ actual . In addition, two types of rounding can be applied, i.e. floor and ceiling. One of these two options is selected based on the value of λ actual by using regularization. If the value of λ is exactly 1, then the user addition time of TS32 is lower than that of TS64 but the storage overhead of TS32 is higher than that of TS64. This is because TS32 has more buckets than TS64 and TS64 has more items in each bucket than TS32. If λ is dynamic and has varying bucket capacity, then regularization is needed. The effect of this regularization was tested using 3 different maximum numbers of authenticated users, i.e. 90, 150 and 200; these values were chosen based on (16) . Moreover, this parameter was complemented by 6 false positive probability values. The result is shown in Table 4 where B actual and λ actual are replaced by B act and λ act for shorter names. The value of B actual was rounded (floor or ceiling) based on (9) . As for the regularization effects on the value of λ actual , this value was closer to 1 compared with λ. This occurred in both TS32 and TS64. If the value of λ actual between TS32 and TS64 is the same, then the storage of TS64 is lower than that of TS32. This is because TS64 tends to increase the number of items in each bucket and minimizes the number of buckets. This condition occurred at N = 90 with FPR = 10 −2 , FPR = 10 
2) RESOURCE CONSUMPTION OF USER ADDITION IN REGULARIZED TINYSET
The relation between storage and execution time for user addition between the two kinds of rounding was analyzed. The result is shown in Fig. 8 . This bar diagrams show both rounding types complemented with the proposed regularized TinySet, represented by diamond markers and connected by a dashed line in order to show the trends. The yellow, black and red diamond markers denote the regularized TinySet with the maximum number of users at 90, 150, and 200, respectively. Fig. 8a and 8b show the storage in the TinySets with a 32-bit and a 64-bit index respectively. It can be seen that a higher false positive probability led to lower storage for all variants of the maximum number of users. Furthermore, the difference between ceiling and floor rounding for TS64 ranged from 52 to 100 bits. The storage overhead for ceiling rounding was always higher than that for floor rounding. In contrast, the difference between ceiling and floor rounding for TS32 ranged from 1 to 119 bits. Mostly, the storage overhead for ceiling rounding was higher than that for floor rounding. However, the storage overhead of floor rounding in several scenarios was higher than that of ceiling rounding, for example at N = 150 with FPR = 10 −6 and N = 200 with FPR = 10 −2 , FPR = 10 −4 , FPR = 10 −5 . Fig. 8a and 8c show the storage overhead and member addition time of TS32. If the result of regularization is floor rounding, TS32 sacrifices addition time for less storage overhead. For example, this occurred at N = 90 with FPR = 10 −5 , which means that regularized TS32 sacrificed about 31 ms of addition time in order to save 5 bits of storage. On the other hand, if the result of regularization is ceiling rounding, TS32 sacrifices storage overhead for less member addition time. For example, this occurred at N = 90 with FPR = 10 −6 , which means regularized TS32 sacrificed 36 bits of storage in order to save about 439 ms of addition time. Moreover, Fig. 8b and 8d show the storage overhead and addition time of TS64. The effects of ceiling and floor rounding were the same as for TS32. An example of ceiling rounding occurred at N = 200 with 
3) RESOURCE CONSUMPTION OF THE STAKEHOLDERS
Further analysis was done of the mechanisms on the stakeholder side, i.e. the administrator and authenticated users, with the sensor nodes acting as receivers. The parameters that were analyzed on the administrator node were the storage overhead and the average time for user addition, whereas on the authenticated user side message encapsulation was analyzed. These processes are the initial communications from the workstation to the sensor nodes. Moreover, the time for verification at the sensor nodes was also analyzed.
The execution time for user addition by the administrator depends on the selected membership scheme. Fig. 9 shows a comparison of the storage overhead between the 3 membership schemes. TS64 had the lowest storage overhead at 150 and 200 registered users. This occurred for all five variants of false positive probability. In contrast, at 90 registered users, TS32 had the lowest storage for almost all false positive probability variants (except 10 −5 and 10 −2 ). For simplicity, it can be concluded that the storage overhead is lower for TS32 and TS64 than for CBF for all false positive probabilities. The storage overhead for TS32 and TS64 was almost the same at the same false probability; the difference ranged from 28 to 115 bits, i.e. under 6.2%. Meanwhile, the difference in storage overhead between CBF and TS32 or TS64 ranged from 1698 to 24261 bits, i.e. more than 77%.
Another parameter that was analyzed was execution time of user addition for the 3 membership schemes. The result is shown in Fig. 10. Fig. 10a shows the execution time of user addition with TinySet. Mostly, TS32 was faster than TS64, except at N = 90 with FPR = 10 −6 and N = 200 with FPR = 10 −1 . The average time of user addition for TS32 was about 477 ms, whereas for TS64 it was about 1228 ms, i.e. more than double that of TS32. This is because the complexity of TinySet is high if the index size and the number of items in each bucket are high. TS32 tended to reduce the number of items in each bucket by adding more buckets. This mechanism can decrease complexity but is mostly followed by an increase in storage overhead. Fig. 10b shows the execution time of user addition for CBF. This membership scheme is shown separately because the deviation in execution time between TinySet and CBF was high in this case. The average execution time of user addition in CBF was about 0.69 ms. This is because CBF only needs k hash operations for adding a user. If one hash operation needs 0.1-0.2 ms then 5 hash operations take about 0.5-1 ms. Based on the storage overhead and execution time results for user addition of the 3 membership schemes it can be seen that TS32 and TS64 were superior in storage overhead, whereas CBF had satisfactory performance in terms of execution time.
The second group of stakeholders are authenticated users (senders). The main mechanism they use is message encapsulation, which can be initiated by either persons or other applications. If the message needs to be encrypted then the M-DCP process must be added. There are 5 processes on the sender side, as can be seen in Fig. 6 . The longest time is used by the sender to find the puzzle solution (process number 4). However, it is guaranteed that this process does not exceed 357795 hash iterations. This value is obtained from (5), using 24 bits of maximum puzzle strength and a quadratic VOLUME 7, 2019 threshold function [28] . If the maximum time needed for 1 hash iteration is 0.5 ms, then the maximum time for puzzle construction is about 178898 ms, or slightly less than 3 minutes. A comparison between two message encapsulations can be seen in Table 5 . The average time required by BAS to process a packet was about 1002 ms, whereas M-DCP needed about 59082 ms for an average security level (l) of 14 bits. The difference is about 98%. The advantage of M-DCP compared to BAS is DoS resistance. The puzzle scheme and session key mechanism strengthen M-DCP against signature-based DoS attacks (the security level details for the proposed scheme are explained in Section IV-C).
The last observation concerns the activities on the receiver side. There are 6 main processes, all which have low complexity. The result of elapsed time for the verification process in the sensor nodes can be seen in Fig. 11 . 'CPCBF', 'CPTS32' and 'CPTS64' indicate M-DCP complemented by CBF, TS32, and TS64, respectively. CBF had the lowest average verification time, i.e. about 677 ms. CPTS64 had the highest average verification time, i.e. 1060 ms. The number of verification processes in CPTS32 or CPTS64 is higher than in CBF but the difference in average verification time was only about 382 ms (36%), i.e. under half a second, which is still acceptable. The other parameters in M-DCP are tag, puzzle and session key. The average time required for verifying these was under 0.5 ms, which is the reason why the difference in average verification time was small. This study focused on developing a lightweight authentication scheme for WSNs that have limited resources. Furthermore, the scheme must be secure enough to transmit sensitive information. Therefore, M-DCP using TS64 is proposed. The user addition time may be higher than that of TS32, but the administrator, who implements this process, has unlimited resources. The WSN only verifies whether the combination of public key and user ID is valid based on the stored TinySet.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Adversary capability was constructed to show the details of the adversaries' environment. The capabilities of an adversary in a single-user, or Direct-Storage-Based Authenticate scheme (DAS), are listed in previous work [28] . Multiuser environments are more complex than single-user environments. The capabilities of a multiuser adversary called adv are:
C-1. adv has the ability to control the message exchange between the administrator, the base station and the sensor nodes. C-2. adv has the ability to obtain all combinations of public key and user ID items D PubK ×D UID within polynomial time, where D PubK and D UID refer to the space of the public key and the user ID, respectively. C-3. adv has the ability to compromise and expose parameters stored in the sensor nodes. C-4. adv has the ability to create and transmit a large number of fake messages. C-5. adv has the ability to create and transmit fake public keys and user IDs as if he is an authorized user.
Capability C-1 means that adv can intercept, modify or eavesdrop messages transmitted between stakeholders. Any modification in a transmitted packet will be known by the sensor nodes either through tag, membership or puzzle verification. These three mechanisms each have their own security level. The security level of tag verification is already mentioned in previous work [28] . The difference is that the size of the tag is fixed, which increases the complexity from 2 l to 2 24 . The security level of membership schemes TS32 and TS64 depends on the false positive probability. A lower value of this parameter leads to higher complexity for adversaries. A 10 −6 false positive probability only requires about 4419 bits or 553 bytes of TS64 storage, whereas an adversary has to try breaking such a TinySet with success probability FPR = 10 −6 . The security level of the puzzle scheme depends on the maximum puzzle strength (l max ). Although the puzzle strength is dynamic, the puzzle value is protected by the session key. In addition, the message, puzzle and next session key are encrypted. If adv only modifies the message part of the transmitted packet, then the packet will pass these three mechanisms. The protection will depend on the signature-based authentication. This value is protected by the private key of the sender. The adversary has to try a maximum of 2 160 iterations. If for each iteration about 0.1 ms is needed, then adv needs about 1.692 × 10 39 days.
Capability C-2 is the same as a brute force attack that tries to reveal the TinySet. The precise numbers of iterations needed to try brute force combination are shown in Table 6 . The complexity of the combination of public key and user ID, D PubK ×D UID = 2 160 ×2 16 = 2 176 iterations. From the point of view of adv the success probability is FPR. If each iteration requires about 0.1 ms and FPR = 10 −6 this will take about 1.108 × 10 44 days.
Capability C-3 means that the information in a sensor node is known by adv. The stored parameters are the index, 10 Accept K (i) and K (i+1) as the correct session key
11
Return 1 (Success) 12 else 13 Return 0 (Failure) 14 end the previous puzzle strength, the TinySet, the commitment key and the private keys of the sensor node. Still, adv needs to find a valid copied puzzle to attack other sensor nodes. Again, this process is protected by the session key. The revealed commitment key does not mean that the adversary knows the next session key. This parameter is computed using a backward one-way key chain, making it impossible to calculate the later session key based on the commitment key. The commitment key is located in the first index and only used for verification, i.e. for determining if the incoming session key is valid or not. Therefore, if a node is compromised, tag and membership verification may be leaked but the puzzle and session key processes are still safe. The safety of the session key is proved by the Random Oracle Model (ROM). This formal security proof uses contradiction, an idea from [41] , [42] . Recall that a random oracle black box (RO(.)) accepts unique input and produces uniformly random output. This function will unconditionally map the input onto a specific output, where the same input will get the same output.
Proposition 1: The proposed M-DCP scheme is computationally secure against an adversary, adv, which has obtained a session key between the user and the WSN under the assumption that the RO acts as a cryptographic hash function.
Proof: An adversary, adv, has the aim of getting an M-DCP session key. He eavesdrops the communication between several senders and the WSN. Assuming that adv can access RO(.), adv can get advantage for his aim. The detailed steps are shown in Algorithm 3, namely EXP1 HASH adv,M −DCP . This process focuses on getting information from the consecutive session keys in the one-way key chain. Both of them are encrypted using RC5 equipped with the previous session key as protection. Moreover, the success probability of Capability C-4 means that adv has no information about the values stored in the sensor nodes but tries to transmit any part of the message. This aims to make the sensor nodes busy verifying fake messages. M-DCP has tag verification, which can verify fake puzzles in under 0.6 ms. Attacks that use this capability include probability attacks and signaturebased DoS attacks. The details of protection against each of them have been shown in previous study [28] .
Based on a list of combinations from capability C-2 and TinySet information from capability C-3, adv can pretend to be a valid user in capability C-5. Adv needs to find a valid puzzle and session key combination to get successful infiltration. Thus, adv has to try D puzzle × D sesionKey i.e. 2 32 × 2 64 iterations. If each iteration requires about 0.1 ms this will take about 9.17 × 10 19 days.
V. CONCLUSION
The use of WSNs in SG applications raises new challenges. User organization, security and WSN characteristics are critical aspects for SG implementation. Therefore, M-DCP for message authentication in WSNs was developed. This scheme meets SG requirements.
M-DCP is complemented with TinySet that organizes user addition, removal, and query with efficient and compact storage. Although TinySet increases the user addition time at the administrator node (which acts as the user manager), the storage overhead decreases by a minimum of 77% and the verification at the sensor nodes increases to under 0.5 second compared to CBF. This membership scheme was optimized by using regularization with the aim of simplifying the administrator's task of defining the initialization parameters for TinySet. A regularized TinySet using a 64-bit index is recommended because in most cases it requires less storage space than a 32-bit index. Moreover, the difference in the user addition time between a 64-bit index and a 32-bit index is under 1 second.
M-DCP adapts the TinySet membership scheme to DCP. MAC processing in the original DCP is eliminated and replaced by two types of the cryptographic hash function. Furthermore, the length of the tag is fixed so the adversaries' complexity increases. The processing time on the sender side is increased because of puzzle generation by a reasonable amount. The verification time for authentication using DCP is only about 382 ms longer than with BAS using CBF, i.e. only about 36% longer. This acceptable overhead increase, both on the sender and the receiver side, is offset by the guarantees of authenticity, confidentiality, and protection against DoS attacks. Therefore, the adversaries' possibility combination using brute force increases to about 1.861 × 10 137 iterations.
A future work will investigate a real implementation of the M-DCP scheme in a multi-hop WSN. This increases the challenge of the sensor node decision whether received packets should be forwarded or authenticated first. Furthermore, the mechanism to quarantine compromised nodes in multihop WSNs increases the complexity of the proposed scheme.
